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Abstract—Dependability of an automation system requires 
engineers to implement formal verification procedures in order 
to eliminate the causes of hazardous conditions. These 
conditions may vary from case to case and will jeopardize the 
dependability of manufacturing lines and operators. Therefore, 
dependability analysis of the control systems to check the 
possibility of state transitions from safe to unsafe states, for 
instance, is essential. Formal verification by using model 
checking procedure is proven as an effective method and widely 
used in practice for automatic verification of correctness 
properties against a finite model of a system. Therefore, in the 
present paper, we introduce a novel method of model checking 
for logic control design. A Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) 
based model checking method is used to analyze and design a 
dependable controller that meets the requirement of certain 
properties, defined by specified predetermined functions.  
 
Index Terms—Binary Decision Diagram (BDD); Computation 




Design phase in the development of an automation system 
could be very critical. The fact is that the design engineers 
who involve in this phase must have technical knowledge and 
experiences, equipped with strong engineering capabilities to 
cope with the design requirements. Although beneficial for 
the engineers, the increasing number of embedded functions 
and features in the design of PLC-based manufacturing 
processes introduce more potential safety risks [1]. Thus, 
their effects on system reliability are much more 
unpredictable. Furthermore, these also lead to design errors 
that affect the functional behavior of the systems. Therefore, 
a successful system design depends on how verification is 
conducted to reduce the possibility of the design errors while 
at the same time eliminate the causes of hazardous 
conditions[2][3]. 
These issues of risks have brought us to the approach of 
formal verification by using model checking. Model checking 
is a formal technique to verify that a mathematical model of 
a system fulfills a formal specification that describes the 
property to be checked. The method is proven to be efficient 
and widely used in practice for automatic verification of 
correctness properties against a finite model of a system. 
Among the popular model checking technique is Binary 
Decision Diagrams (BDDs), that can represent set of states 
symbolically. 
Our present work proposes in this paper is a new technique 
of model checking for logic control design. A Computation 
Tree Logic (CTL) temporal logic is used to analyze and 
design a dependable controller that meets the requirement of 
certain properties, defined by a predetermined function. The 
safety function, for instance, is obtained from hazardous 
conditions which are the property that may put the system into 
unsafe states. In addition, we verify the effectiveness of the 
proposed method by experiments on a pick-and-place arm 
system, controlled using a PLC. We describe the designed 
controller in the ladder diagram (LD) format. The control 
system and specified property functions are then transformed 
into Boolean formulas before analysis on the dependability of 
the system are carried out.  
 
II. RELATED WORKS 
 
The concept of formal methods has inspired design 
engineers to implement it for logic control design and 
synthesis. This is to ensure that no unusual conditions and 
hazardous behaviors occur that may lead to design errors that 
will cause malfunction of control systems. In other words, the 
aim is to improve the dependability of logic controllers. 
Starting from the implementation to digital functions for 
logical analysis [4] in the late 70’s, BDDs have been widely 
applied in numerous research fields because of its ’powerful 
representation’ of various kind of control systems. Bryant’s 
approach of BDD manipulation algorithms to logic design 
verification [5][6] is a cornerstone of the new formalism of 
model checking technique. Burch et. al. introduced a BDD-
based algorithm for symbolic CTL (Computation Tree Logic) 
model checking [7] with several techniques to improve the 
efficiency of verification methods based on reachability 
analysis. Later, instead of BDDs, an alternative approach 
which is SAT-based procedures for propositional 
satisfiability problems has been proposed to cope with the 
state space explosion when using BDDs [8]. This method is 
familiarly known as Bounded Model Checking (BMC). The 
performances of these techniques on diversified hardware 
benchmarks have also been investigated[9]. In addition to 
CTL model checking in formal verification of a system, 
analysis of linear time-based LTL (Linear Temporal Logic) 
specifications to verify safety properties also have been 
carried out thoroughly [10][11], giving the definition of 
safety in different manners.  
On the other hand, one of the methods used [12] to 
synthesize control laws for the logic controllers is by solving 
a Boolean equation that represents all the requirements. Our 
proposed method introduced is basically followed this 
interpretation but uses different notions in the algebraic 
approach. A familiar concept of symbolic and algebraic 
method framework in discrete event system applications was 
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introduced by Gunnarsson [13][14]. He proposed a method of 
control law syntheses by using polynomials over a finite field 
and Gr¨obner bases as the computation tools. Formally 
introduced in 1965 [15], the application of Gr¨obner bases 
currently seems to be borderless. This powerful tool is 
originally developed for algorithmic solutions of polynomial 
ideal theory before it becomes an effective and practical 
method used to solve engineering and mathematical 
problems. Its applications are broad, for example in reliability 
improvement of mathematical structure [16], and also time-
optimal control by solving problems of finding solutions for 
algebraic equations [17]. 
The unique representation of Gröbner bases algorithmic 
solution has given us the idea for applying it in formal 
verification procedures of logic control systems [18]. We also 
have successfully implemented several model checking 
procedures to verify the safety of the sequential systems by 
using this powerful method[19]-[22]. 
 
III. LOGIC CONTROL SYSTEM 
 
Consider a logic control system consisting of discrete 
signals as shown in Figure 1. Here u is the actuator input and 
y is the sensor output. The system shows the relationship 
between the plant and the controller. In this paper, a plant 
represented in Boolean algebra is considered: 
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Figure 1: Control system architecture 
 
Assuming that all of the variables, namely, the plant state x 
and input u, represented by vectors formed by the elements of 
a binary set, B of true (1) and false (0), and having 
dimensions of np and m, then the following can be stated: xp(k) 
∈ Bnp is the state vector and u(k) ∈ Bm is the actuator input 
vector of the plant. In addition, k  is a positive integer that 
expresses time. Furthermore, the plant itself is a strictly 
proper system that whose input does not influence the output 
at the same event time. 
Meanwhile, the controller is represented by the following 
state equation: 
 
                 ))(),(()1( kukxhku cc                               (2) 
 
where xc(k) ∈ Bnc represents the state vector of the controller, 
having a dimension of nc at the event time k. Furthermore, the 
state equations of the entire system can also actually be 
represented by combining both the plant model and the 
controller. 
The state space of the system also includes the input state 
space, which consists of both xc and xp. The entire system state 
space with (np + nc) order is a set of 2np+nc state combinations. 
For this kind of system, physically unreachable state space is 
defined as infeasible space; otherwise, it is feasible space. In 
addition, when there is normal state space in certain control 
specification, it is defined as a safe state; otherwise, it is an 
unsafe state. Figure 2 categorizes the state into four patterns 
of combinations of feasible/infeasible and safe/unsafe states. 
A real system is normally controlled within the normal state 
space; however, in the case where disturbances and faults of 
the sensor or actuator occur, it is possible for the system to be 
out of the normal state space. In these situations, the 
controller must be designed so that it will avoid any state 
transitions to the unsafe space. 
 
Figure 2: Category of state space 
 
IV. MODELING OF A CASE STUDY EXAMPLE 
 
In this section, we report the experimental setup and 
modeling Boolean formulas of verifying a logic control 
system by using a pick-and-place arm workstation. We 
provide a plant model that describes the system configuration, 
then we design its control logic based on the regular 
operation. To verify whether the designed control system 
meets the safety specification, we take an example of a 
hazardous state that will be defined as a safety function, 
described in detail in a later subsection. 
The pick-and-place arm workstation uses PLC 
programming software as its controller and the logic 
programming tool is based on the IEC 61131-3. Figure 3 
illustrates the block diagram of the workstation, with a set of 




Figure 3: Schematic diagram pick and place arm 
 
The state's definition, where all variable x stands for state 
inputs and all variable u for actuator outputs are summarized 
in Table 1. 
By referring to Table 1, we create the pre-post condition 
table that shows the relationship between input and output of 
the model. This is the preliminary step in order to get the 
model of the entire pick-and-place system. Table 2 to Table 6 
show the operational models of each arm at different states 
and conditions. 
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Table 1 
States Definition of Inputs and Outputs 
 
Input (Sensors) Output (Actuators) 
x8 Base at workstation u8 Moving from workstation 
to conveyor 
x9 Conveyor sensor uA Moving from conveyor to 
station 
x10 Workstation sensor u10 Moving upward 
x11 Top sensor u11 Moving downward 
x13 Object in suction cup u12 Suction on 
 
For example, in Table 3, the result of pre-post conditions 
of arm 2 is expressed by the following statements (case by 
case from first until the fourth row of the table): 
1) When arm is at conveyor position if arm starts to 
actuate to the workstation, then on the next event time 
(k +1) arm will not be on conveyor nor at workstation 
position. 
2) When the arm is not on the conveyor nor at the 
workstation position, if arm starts to actuate to the 
workstation, then on the next event time arm will be at 
workstation position. 
3) When the arm is at workstation position, if arm starts 
to actuate to the conveyor, then on the next event time 
arm will not be on conveyor nor at workstation 
position. 
4) When the arm is not on the conveyor nor at the 
workstation position, if arm starts to actuate to the 
conveyor, then on the next event time arm will be at 
conveyor position. 
 
Table 2  
Operational Model of Arm 1 
 
Pre-Cond. Input Post-Cond. 
x8 x11 u10 u11 dx8 dx11 
1 1 0 1 1 0 
1 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 1 
 
By the pre-post condition obtained in Table 2, we get the 
Boolean expressions as in Equations (3) and (4): 
 
          
111011810111188 uuxxuuxxdx                                  (3) 
         
8101111101111811 xuuxuuxxdx                                 (4) 
                               
The procedure is similar to the rest of operational models, 




Operational Model of Arm 2 
 
Pre-Cond. Input Post-Cond. 
x9 x10 uA u8 dx9 dx10 
1 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 1 
0 1 0 1 0 0 
0 0 0 1 1 0 
 
From Table 3, we obtained the following equations: 
 
 
           
810981099 uuxxuuxxdx AA                              (5) 
           
AA uuxxuuxxdx 8910810910                              (6) 
 
    
 
 
Figure 4: Flowchart of pick-and-place arm operation 
 
Table 4 and Table 5 are the operational models for suction 
activation, which involves a number of sensors and input 
states. Therefore, the Boolean expression for this model is 
stated in Equation (7). 
 







                    (7) 
 
From Table 5, the mathematical expression for suction 
actuation of arm 1 at conveyor can be written as: 
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Table 4  
Operational Model for Suction Activation of Arm 1 at Workstation 
 



























1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 




Operational Model for Suction Activation of Arm 1 at Conveyor 
 



























0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 
 
The last operational model as in Table 6, is obtained for 
suction activation of arm 2, as in Equation (9). 
 





















                 (9) 
 
Table 6   
Operational Model for Suction Activation of Arm 2 
 



























1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 
1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 
1 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 
0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 
 
 
V. DESIGN OF CONTROL LOGIC 
 
We use ladder diagram (LD) as a tool of PLC language in 
designing the logic controller. The controller is designed to 
operate and control the plant as the actual operation of the 
pick and place robotic system. Figure 4 shows the logic 
controller for the pick and place system, while Table 7 shows 
the addresses used in the ladder diagram. 
For precautionary steps or safety measures to ensure that 
the controller is safe, every rung needs to include all the 
sensors and outputs. To differentiate, each rung has different 
sensors that need to be activated and deactivated with 
reference to the sensor involve for the actuation to occur. 
From the controller, the Boolean mathematical model is 
generated in order to verify together with the system model 
using Symbolic Model Verifier (SMV) software. The 
following equations are the actuation equations generated 










                  
121110813910118 uuuuxxxxxduA                   (10) 
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81311109910812           (14) 
where, 
 
duA  :  post condition for actuation arm moving from  
conveyor to the workstation (rung 1) 
du11 : post condition for actuation arm moving downward 
(rung 2) 
du10 : post condition for actuation arm moving upward 
(rung 3) 
du8  : post condition for actuation arm moving from 
workstation to conveyor (rung 4) 
du12 : post condition for actuation for suction (rung 5) 
 
VI. INITIAL ANALYSIS ON DEPENDABILITY 
 
In this study, dependability is defined by several properties 
such as safety, resettability and reachability. 
 
A. Property 1: Safety 
Safety property is a forbidden state that is not supposed to 
occur or “nothing bad should happen”. Safety property is 
important in model checking because it determines whether 
the system is safe to operate or not. If the verification result 
is FALSE, then the system is unsafe and there might be an 
error in the designed controller. For the pick and place 
system, the forbidden state is the arm under all circumstances 
will not move from conveyor to workspace (right and left 
movement) when it is at the bottom position.  
 
EG – there exist a path for the specification to hold TRUE 
globally in the future. 
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Figure 5: Logic controller for pick-and-place arm  
 









                       (15) 
 
B. Property 2: Reachability 
Reachability property is a property to check can the system 
reach to the certain next state from its present state. Given the 
system in a particular state, could it possibly reach a state 
which satisfies certain given properties sometimes in the 
future. For the pick and place system, the reachability 
specification can be written as Equation (16) which means at 
the present state where the arm is at the conveyor, top 
position, can it reach to the next state, which is at the 
workstation, top position. 
 
AG – for every path the specification holds TRUE globally in 
the future. 
 
EF – there exist a path for the specification to hold TRUE 
sometime in the future. 
 









            (16) 
 
C. Property 3: Resettability 
Another property is resettability, which is a property to 
check whether the system at any present state, will be reset 
back to its original position. When arm at the bottom position 
at workstation and suction occurs, eventually it will reset 
back to its home position. The next equation is the 
specification written in the Symbolic Model Verifier (SMV) 
software to verify the robotic pick and place system. 
 
AG – for every path the specification holds true globally in 
the future. 
 
EF – there exist a path for the specification to hold true 
sometime in the future. 
 









      (17) 
 
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS 
             
This paper discussed on designing a dependable logic 
controller for a robotic pick and place system. The context of 
dependable is defined by verification of the logic controller 
whether meets the defined temporal properties or not. In other 
words, the system must be verified before can be operated in 
for real application. To verify the dependability of the logic 
controller, properties such as safety requirement, reachability 
and resettability are the specifications used. In future, The 
simulation by using model checking software will be used to 
determine the independable condition of the system that may 
lead to system errors and malfunction so that precautionary 
steps can be taken earlier. 
               
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
 
The authors are pleased to acknowledge the financial and 
administrative support from the Minister of Higher Education 
(MOHE), Malaysia and Universiti Teknikal Malaysia Melaka 
under the FGRS/1/2015/TK04/FKE/02/F00263 research 
grant project entitled “A Novel Method of Groebner Bases 




[1] IEC, Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable 
electronic safety-related systems-Part 6: Guidelines on the application 
of IEC 61508-2 and IEC 61508-3, International Standard IEC 61508-
6, International Electrotechnical Commission, 2010. 
[2] P. J. G. Ramadge and W. M. Wonham, “The Control of Discrete Event 
Systems,” Proc. of the IEEE, vol.77, pp. 81-97, 1989. 
[3] C. G. Cassandras and S. Lafortune, “Introduction to Discrete Event 
Systems,” Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 1999. 
[4] S. B. Akers, “Binary Decision Diagrams,” IEEE Trans. Comput., 
vol.C-27, pp. 509-516, June 1978. 
[5]  R. E. Bryant, “Graph-based Algorithms for Boolean Function 
Manipulation,” IEEE Trans. Comp., vol. C-35, Aug. 1986. 
Journal of Telecommunication, Electronic and Computer Engineering 
158 e-ISSN: 2289-8131   Vol. 10 No. 1-3  
[6] K. S. Brace, R. L. Rudell and R. E. Bryant, “Efficient Implementation 
of a BDD Package,” in Proc. 27th ACM/IEEE Design Automation 
Conf., pp. 759-764, 1990. 
[7] J. R. Burch, E. M. Clarke, D. E. Long, K. L. McMillan and D. L. Dill, 
“Symbolic Model Checking for Sequential Circuit Verification,” IEEE 
Trans. Computer-Aided Design of Integ. Circuits and Syst., vol. 13, no. 
4, pp. 401-424, April 1994. 
[8] A. Biere, A. Cimatti, E. M. Clarke, M. Fujita, Y. Zhu,“Symbolic Model 
Checking Using SAT Procedures Instead of BDDs,” in Proc. 36th 
Annual ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference, pp. 317-320, 1999. 
[9] N. Amla, X. Du, A. Kuehlmann, R. P. Kurshan and K. L. 
McMillan,“An Analysis of SAT-based Model Checking Techniques in 
An Industrial Environment,” Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 
SpringerLink, 2005. 
[10] O. Kupferman and M. Vardi, “Model Checking of Safety Properties,” 
in Formal Methods in System Design, 2001. 
[11] T. Latvala, “Efficient Model Checking of Safety Properties,” in Model 
Checking Software, 10th Int. SPIN Workshop, USA. 
[12] Y. Hietter, J. M. Roussel and J. J. Lesage, “Algebraic synthesis of 
dependable logic controllers,” in 17th IFAC World Congress, 
Seoul,Korea, 2008. 
[13]  J. Gunnarsson, “Symbolic Methods and Tools for Discrete Event 
Dynamic Systems,” Ph.D. Thesis, Linköping University, Sweden, 
1997. 
[14] J. Gunnarson, “Algebraic Methods for Discrete Event Systems – A 
Tutorial,” Proc. of IEE WODES’96, Edinburgh (GB), pp. 18-30, 1996. 
[15] B. Buchberger, “Gröbner Bases: An Algorithmic Method in 
Polynomial Ideal Theory,” in N. K. Bose Ed., Multidimensional 
Systems Theory, D. Reidel Publishing, pp. 184-232, 1985. 
[16] B. Giglio, Daniel Q. Naiman and H. P. Wynn, “Gröbner Bases, 
Abstract Tubes, and Inclusion-Exclusion Reliability Bounds,” IEEE 
Trans. Reliability, vol. 51, no. 3, pp. 358-366, Sept. 2002. 
[17] U. Walther, T. T. Georgiou and A. Tannenbaum, “On the Computation 
of Switching Surfaces in Optimal Control: A Gr¨obner Bases 
Approach,” in IEEE Trans. Auto. Control, vol.46, no.4, pp. 534-540, 
April 2001. 
[18] S. Alwi and Y. Fujimoto, “Formal Verification of Logic Control 
Systems with Nondeterministic Behaviors”, in IEEJ Journal of 
Industry Applications 2(16), pp. 306-314, 2013. 
[19] Saifulza bin Alwi, “Verification and Validation of Logic Control 
Systems by Model Checking”, Ph.D Thesis, Yokohama National 
University, 2013. 
[20] S. Alwi and Y. Fujimoto, “Safety Property Comparison between 
Gr¨obner Bases and BDD-based Model Checking method” in 13th 
International Conference on Control, Automation, Robotics and Vision 
(ICARCV), Singapore. 2014. 
[21] S. Alwi and Y. Fujimoto, “On A Safety of Sequential Control System 
based on Gr¨obner Bases Computation” in 2010 Int. Conf. On Control, 
Automation and Systems (ICCAS2010), KINTEX, Korea. 
[22] S. Alwi and Y. Fujimoto, “A Gr¨obner Bases approach for Safety 
Evaluation of Logic Control System”, in Proc. IEEE Industrial 
Informatics (INDIN), Osaka, Japan, 2010.
 
 
